疫情冲击下地方政府与中小型服务企业应对策略的演化博弈分析
作者:
作者单位:

南京信息工程大学管理工程学院

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金面上项目“重大疫情下区域产业共生网络韧性评估及提升路径研究” (项目负责人:单海燕,批准号:72074121);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究“重大疫情下区域产业生态系统风险识别与应对研究”(项目负责人:单海燕,批准号:2020SJA0187).


Evolutionary game analysis of response strategies of local government and small and medium-sized service enterprises under the impact of epidemic
Author:
Affiliation:

1.School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science &2.Technology

  • 摘要
  • | |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • | |
  • 引证文献
  • | |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    新冠疫情爆发至今,中小型服务企业受到的冲击尤为巨大。以地方政府和中小型服务企业联合发行消费券应对疫情为背景,构建地方政府、中小型服务企业和消费者的三方演化博弈模型,研究政府有偿补贴的影响因子、公信力的影响因子、消费券抵扣金额的影响因子等因素对各利益相关方策略的影响,以期实现地方政府与中小型服务企业良性合作,真正刺激消费,让利于民。结果表明:政府有偿扶持策略下补贴额较低、有偿扶持策略对公信力的影响较大,将促使政府选择对企业进行有偿扶持;企业积极自救策略下所获有偿补贴较高、对消费券抵扣金额较少,企业更愿意坚持积极自救策略;消费券对消费者实际消费额的影响程度较小、积极自救企业对消费券抵扣金额较多,将促使消费者选择持券消费;实施差异化的扶持政策、结合消费券精准发放,可促进经济复苏。

    Abstract:

    Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the impact of small and medium-sized service enterprises has been particularly strong. Based on the background that local government and small and medium-sized service enterprises jointly issue consumption vouchers to deal with the epidemic situation, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, small and medium-sized service enterprises and consumers, and studies the influence factors of government paid subsidies, credibility, consumption voucher deduction amount and other factors on the strategies of each stakeholder, in order to realize the benign cooperation between local governments and small and medium-sized service enterprises, stimulate consumption and benefit the people. The results show that under the government paid support strategy, the subsidy amount is low, and the paid support strategy has a greater impact on the credibility, which will prompt the government to choose paid support for enterprises; Under the positive self-help strategy, the enterprises are more willing to adhere to the positive self-help strategy with higher paid subsidies and less deduction for consumption vouchers; The impact of consumption vouchers on the actual consumption amount of consumers is small, and the positive self-help enterprises have more deductions for consumption vouchers, which will encourage consumers to choose voucher consumption; The implementation of differentiated support policies, combined with the accurate issuance of consumption vouchers, can promote economic recovery.

    参考文献
    [1] 周新辉, 李昱喆, 李富有. 新冠疫情对中小服务型企业影响评估及对策研究——基于回归算法优化模型的分析预测[J]. 经济评论, 2020(03): 101-117.
    [2] 陈诗一, 王永钦, 吴友. 疫情冲击下中小微企业的纾困政策研究[J]. 复旦公共行政评论, 2021(01): 9-14.
    [3] 李刚, 黄思枫. 全球新冠疫情背景下我国中小企业生存与发展对策研究——基于数字化转型和商业模式升级应对策略分析[J]. 价格理论与实践, 2020(07): 13-16.
    [4] Ashraf Badar Nadeem. Economic impact of government interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic: International evidence from financial markets[J]. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2020, 27
    [5] 朱武祥, 张平, 李鹏飞, et al. 疫情冲击下中小微企业困境与政策效率提升——基于两次全国问卷调查的分析[J]. 社会科学文摘, 2020(06): 5-7.
    [6] 林毅夫, 沈艳, 孙昂. 中国政府消费券政策的经济效应[J]. 经济研究, 2020, 55(07): 4-20.
    [7] 朱军,张淑翠,李建强. 突发疫情的经济影响与财政干预政策评估[J].经济与管理评论,2020,36( 3) : 21 - 32.
    [8] 吴晓波, 沈华杰, 吴东. 不确定性、互补性资产与商业模式设计:新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情期间的多案例研究[J]. 科研管理, 2020, 41(07): 189-200.
    [9] 陈闻鹤, 常志朋, 宫晓虹. 基于马田系统的企业疫情防控风险集对评估模型[J]. 软科学, 2020, 34(11): 137-144.
    [10] 赵雪芹, 李天娥, 莫长镭. 基于政策工具的我国新冠肺炎疫情背景下企业复工复产政策文本分析[J]. 情报理论与实践, 2020, 43(08): 21-28.
    [11] 盛东方, 尹航. 基于政策文本计算的突发公共事件下中小企业扶持政策供需匹配研究——以新冠肺炎疫情为例[J]. 现代情报, 2020, 40(08): 10-19.
    [12] 阳镇, 尹西明, 陈劲. 新冠肺炎疫情背景下平台企业社会责任治理创新[J]. 管理学报, 2020, 17(10): 1423-1432.
    [13] 李亚兵, 夏月. 新冠肺炎疫情下零售企业商业模式创新风险识别与评价[J]. 统计与决策, 2021, 37(02): 163-167.
    [14] 冯兰萍, 钱春琳, 庞庆华, et al. 基于三方博弈模型的突发事件网络舆情政府干预时机分析[J]. 情报理论与实践: 1-14.
    [15] 谢地, 王齐. 抗击新冠肺炎疫情的经济学分析——从“三方博弈”看中美两国抗疫的策略、效果及原因[J]. 政治经济学评论, 2020, 11(04): 193-224.
    [16] James Meade.Consumers Credits and Unemployment [M], London: Oxford University Press,1938.
    [17] Selten R. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1980, 84(1): 93-101.
    [18] Ritzberger K, Weibull J W. Evolutionary selection in normal-form games[J].Econometrica, 1995, 63(6): 1371-1399.
    [19] Lyapunov A M. The general problem of the stability of motion[J]. International Journal of Control, 1992, 55(3): 531-534.
    [20] Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666.
    [21] Zhang L L, Long R Y, Huang Z, et al. Evolutionary game analysis on the implementation of subsidy policy for sustainable transportation development[J]. Journal of cleaner production, 2020, 267: 122159.
    相似文献
    引证文献
    网友评论
    网友评论
    分享到微博
    发 布
引用本文

单海燕,皮文杰,许吉俐.疫情冲击下地方政府与中小型服务企业应对策略的演化博弈分析[J].南京信息工程大学学报,,():

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:144
  • 下载次数: 0
  • HTML阅读次数: 0
  • 引用次数: 0
历史
  • 收稿日期:2021-12-21
  • 最后修改日期:2022-03-20
  • 录用日期:2022-03-27

地址:江苏省南京市宁六路219号    邮编:210044

联系电话:025-58731025    E-mail:nxdxb@nuist.edu.cn

南京信息工程大学学报 ® 2025 版权所有  技术支持:北京勤云科技发展有限公司